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ABSTRACT: We develop a flexible model to examine competitive
conditions in the food retailing industry based on the Box-Cox
transformation of the demand and industry equilibrium conditions. 
The impact of key technological and market developments on shifts
in the competitive index is examined.  Adoption of optical
scanning technology was positively related to the market power
index but the index was stable and consistent with competitive
conditions over the 1982-1992 period. 
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COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE FOOD RETAILING INDUSTRY
Food retailing is an important industry in the United States
in its contribution to the GNP and employment.  Sales and
employment in the food retail industry represent a significant
and growing component of the U.S. service economy, dwarfing the
combined values for the automobile, steel and machine-tools
industries.
Two closely linked changes in the food retailing industry
motivate this research.  First, the structure of the food
retailing industry was dramatically altered by leveraged buyouts
(LBO's), mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructuring
during the 1980s.  Grocery retailers offered steady cash flows
matched with undervalued, readily saleable assets and food
retailing became a primary target for merger and takeover
activity.  The total amount of financial leverage increased
significantly, shifting away from short-term liabilities toward
long-term debt.
A second important industry development was the increasing
concentration in food retailing, particularly at the regional
level, due to the surge of mergers and leveraged buyouts,
resulting in fewer and larger food stores.  Cotterill (1992)
noted a "trend toward fewer, larger supermarkets owned by large
chains" resulting in increased market concentration and
segmentation and strategic marketing techniques to deter entry. 
Chain stores registered significant growth in market share, as
firms increasingly developed integrated marketing patterns with
stores in several geographic regions.3
Increases in market concentration and market segmentation
has promoted concern that retail food store owners exert market
power and set prices above the average cost of production. 
Previous studies that employed the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm to understand the market conduct of food retailers
centered their focus on the relationships between price and
market structure measurements such as firm concentration, market
growth, and per capita income (see Cotterill, 1993).
We use an alternative approach that explicitly measures the
degree of competitiveness in the food retail industry.  The model
is based on the assumption that firms maximize profits.  This
approach yields precise, easily interpretable statistical tests
for the degree of market power in food retailing.  Financial
variables are incorporated into the industry cost function to
account for the effect of changes in industry financial structure
on the competitiveness of the industry.
In section II, the theoretical framework of the cost
function and the industry equilibrium condition are presented. 
The data, construction of variables, and the application of the
model to the food retail industry are developed in section III. 
Interpretation of results and the implications for competitive
behavior in the food retail industry are discussed in section IV. 
Section V concludes the paper.
II. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND THE COST FUNCTION
A model to measure the degree of market power used by
Bresnahan is applied to aggregate industry data in food










condition to reveal the degree of market power.  The basis of the
model is that profit-maximizing firms set marginal cost equal to
perceived marginal revenue.  When perceived marginal revenue
equals market price, the outcome is consistent with perfectly
competitive behavior.  When perceived marginal revenue equals
industry marginal revenue, this result indicates imperfect
competition or collusion.
In the theoretical model firms maximize profits by setting
marginal cost equal to perceived marginal revenue.  The actual
marginal revenue function is
where P is industry price.  The inverse demand function for
industry output is D (Q, Z, *) where Q denotes aggregate
-1
industry output, Z represents a set of exogenous variables, and *
is a vector of demand system parameters.
A firm's perceived marginal revenue is  
where 8 is an estimated parameter which represents an index of
market power and is restricted to lie between 0 and 1.  When    
8 = 0, firms behave as perfect competitors by setting price equal
to marginal cost.  A value for 8 = 1, indicates perfect collusion
or joint monopoly when firms choose output or prices based on
industry marginal revenue.  As an index of firm behavior, 8
measures the gap between marginal cost and price or the degree of

































To maximize profit marginal revenue (MR) is equated to
marginal cost (MC) and this condition is rewritten as: 
We refer to this as the linear
industry equilibrium condition.  An
equivalent form of the industry
equilibrium condition in logarithmic form is 
Sjostrom shows that
this form can be
conveniently
approximated as  The
Box-Cox transformation Y  = (Y  - 1)/2 contains both the linear
(2) 2
and logarithmic specifications of industry equilibrium and can be
used to test between the competing models.  We specify demand and
marginal cost functions which allow us to nest the linear and
logarithmic model in the Box-Cox model.
Let demand for output from food retailers be specified using
the Box-Cox transformation as: 
where Q is the quantity of food sold by food retailers and P  is Q
the price of food.  The exogenous variables in the demand
function are represented by the vector Z and include per capita
disposable income, the price of food away from home as a
substitute for food purchased from food retailers, and the
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Following Baker let marginal cost be 
where C is total variable cost, Q is industry output, w  are i
exogenous input prices, and F  is a set of financial variables.  i
The input prices represent goods sold by food retailers (w ), 2
capital (w ), labor (w ), and energy (w ).   34 5
Following Kim and Maksimovic the impact of leverage is
incorporated into the cost function for the food retailing
industry in two financial variables.  Industry analysts noted the
role of financial leverage in the restructuring of the food
retailing industry.  Cotterill (1992) focused on the link between
increased debt and rising concentration in food retailing, noting
that the "historically unprecedented increase in financial
leverage and total value of the industry was concentrated
primarily in the operations of large retailers."  We examine
whether changes in total current liabilities (F ) and long-term 1
debt have shifted the industry cost function (F ).  2
The generalized industry equilibrium condition using the
marginal cost and inverse demand functions defined above is
The linear model results when 2 = 1 while the logarithmic model
is appropriate when 2 = 0.  This generalized model allows us to
specify a more flexible set of demand and marginal cost
specifications.7
The system of equations represented by the generalized
industry equilibrium condition in equation (8) and the demand
function facing the food retailing industry in equation (6) is
estimated jointly.  Additive error terms <  are appended to the i
system of equations.  The error terms for the estimated system
are assumed to be identically distributed normal random vectors
with mean vector zero and nonsingular covariance matrix V.  The
estimated parameters are obtained using nonlinear three-stage
least squares imposing the implied cross-equation restrictions.
III.  MODEL SPECIFICATION
The cost function for the food retailing industry is based
on the inputs for foods sold, labor, energy, and capital. 
Changes in these inputs have played an important role in the cost
and financial structure of the industry.  The Food Marketing
Institute's (FMI) financial review of the supermarket industry
noted the importance of capital spending in food retailing.  The
Institute's reports show the increase in interest expenses along
with the growth of net property and equipment, measured as a
percent of total assets.
Annual data from 1967 through 1992 were used in the
estimation.  Annual nominal price indexes for processed food
inputs, labor, energy, and capital are reported in the Food Cost
Review.  An annual labor price index for the food retailing
industry is based on the average annual hourly earnings for
retail food workers.  The labor price index includes employee
benefits such as employer social security taxes, unemployment
taxes, pensions, and health insurance costs.  The total price8
index for energy includes components for electricity, petroleum,
and natural gas.  The reported capital price index was based on
the implicit GNP deflator for new plant and equipment.  All price
indexes were deflated by the consumer price index for food
consumed at home to obtain a constant-dollar price index series.
Annual constant dollar sales were used as the measure of
annual output in food retailing (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
Information on cost of food inputs (good sold in food retailing)
for food retailers is gathered from yearly reports issued by
Robert Morris Associates.
Price indexes for food at home and food away from home are
reported in Food Cost Review.  The food away from home sector
includes eating and drinking places such as restaurants and fast
food outlets, hotels and motels and other institutional
organizations.  Consumer expenditures on food away from home
offer an alternative to food purchased from food retailers.
As more women enter the labor force and their value of time
increases, the demand for food away from home shifts.  The effect
of the decrease in demand for food eaten at home is incorporated
into the demand equation by including the ratio of female to male
wages.  The data on median female and male incomes are available
in the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
Measures for two financial variables are used in the cost
function to reflect the impact of changes in the financial
structure on the industry.  The financial variables are the total
current liabilities and the amount of long-term debt for food
retail stores, which are available from Robert Morris Associates.9
Total current liabilities are composed of short-term
liabilities including accounts payable, notes payable, income
taxes payable, and other liabilities.  The changing liabilities
structure of the industry balance sheet is most apparent in the
growth of long-term debt.  Long-term debt includes bonds,
debentures, bank debt, mortgages and capital lease obligations.  
Long-term debt grew significantly during the 1980s as the
industry shifted from equity to debt financing, expanding from 16
percent of total assets in 1967 to a peak of 25 percent of total
assets in 1986.  Total current liabilities averaged about 39
percent of total assets during the sample period.  Fluctuations
in the key components of current liabilities are highlighted each
year in the FMI annual financial review.
IV.  MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The parameter estimates and R-squared measures for the
industry equilibrium condition and the demand equation are
presented in Table 1 and Table 2 for the logarithmic and linear
model respectively.  The model of industry equilibrium and
competitive structure provides insight into the structure of the
food retailing industry as measured by the index of market power. 
We examine the impact of key technological and market
developments on shifts in the index.  In a final issues we
comment on the comparative performance and flexibility of the
competing models of industry conduct. 
Model Diagnostics and Tests
Before interpreting the market power index we examine a
general set of diagnostic tools which confirm the consistency of10
the model with economic theory.  The validity of the model in
identifying 8 is confirmed by a statistical test.  The necessary
and sufficient condition for identification of the market power
index defined by Lau is that the demand function is not separable
in the exogenous variables.
The coefficients on two interaction terms with the price of
food from food retailers are both significantly different from
zero:  coefficients for the price of food away from home and the
ratio of female to male wages.  The fitted demand curve is
downward sloping over the sample period consistent with economic
theory.  An increase in the price of food purchased away from
home induces consumers to expand food purchased from food
retailers, indicating that consumers consider these substitute
goods.  The estimated income effect is also positive implying
that food purchased from retailers is a normal good.
In the linear demand equation, the relative wage rate has a
negative relationship with the demand for food purchased from
food retailers, suggesting that increases in female wages lower
the demand for food eaten at home.
In the industry equilibrium equation, marginal cost is
increasing in industry output.  The coefficients for both the
price of capital and price of energy indicate that marginal cost
is positively influenced by these two inputs.  The marginal cost
curve is negatively related to changes in wage levels.
The hypothesis that the financial variables do not affect
the industry cost function is rejected.  Changes in total current
liabilities have contributed to increases in costs but increases11
in long-term debt have lead to an increase in efficiency. 
Investors in long-term debt have incentives to engage in closer
monitoring of the firm to protect against wealth transfers to
stockholders.  These findings are consistent with results
summarized by Maloney et al. indicating that leverage increases
managerial work effort and enhances decision making by managers
to lower costs. 
Competitive Conduct in Food Retailing
We allow the index of market power 8 to vary in response to
shifts in industry conditions and technological innovations in
food retailing.  The market power index was specified as linear
function of three variables and we will define these variables
here and evaluate their impact on the market power measure.  The
variables are average weekly sales per checkout, the percentage
of stores using scanning technology, and a dummy variable
representing intensified merger activity from 1983-1992. 
Progressive Grocer's annual survey of the grocery industry
reports information on industry conditions, productivity
measures, and consumer trends.  A key industry productivity
measure monitored consistently in the Progressive Grocer surveys
is weekly sales volume per checkout.  Information on sales per
checkout are presented in categories based on sales volume per
store, by region of the country, and by total square footage of
selling area.
The impact of sales per checkout on the market power index
is positive but not statistically significant.  Industry analysts
typically use sales per checkout figures to identify economies of12
scale and to gauge store efficiency in supermarket retailing. 
Sales figures suggest the optimal number of checkouts to allocate
per store and the most efficient store size.  Sales per checkout
are uniformly higher each year in the sample for supermarkets
with higher total sales.  However, the empirical results do not
indicate that the higher productivity of larger stores had a
significant impact on competitive conditions in food retailing. 
The Progressive Grocer survey reports the percentage of
stores using scanning technology each year. The annual operating
survey of grocery stores initially reported on the percentage of
stores using scanning technology in 1981.  We extrapolate the
existing data series on scanning technology gathered from the
trade journal backward from 1980 to 1974 to obtain the figures
for missing years.  For years prior to 1974, the annual survey
noted that the use of scanners was negligible.
Optical scanners were first available by 1972, but adoption
was feasible only after the development of the standardized
Uniform Product Code in 1973.  Levin et al. noted that the first
scanners were installed in 1974 and by August 1981 scanners were
installed in about 12 percent of stores in the United States.
Optical scanners speed the checkout process and increase
labor productivity.  Initial analysis of optical scanners by
industry observers suggested that the estimated savings to a
medium-sized store with $140,000 per week in sales was about
$199,000 per year in 1975.  Given average costs ranging from
about $110,000 to $130,00 per year, Coyle suggested that the
costs of installing the optical scanners could potentially be13
recovered in about one year.  Walsh argued that scanning, in
conjunction with development of the universal product code (UPC),
facilitated the spread of computerization and automation
throughout supermarket operation into ordering and inventory and
product control. 
In the economics literature the impact of competitive
conditions on the adoption of innovations is ambiguous.  
Reinganum's theoretical model suggested that increased
competition delays the adoption of a cost-reducing, capital-
intensive innovation.  The cost of policing a collusive agreement
decreases with technological advances in information and data
processing, leading firms with market power to adopt new
technology at a more rapid pace than competitive firms.  This
implies that adoption of scanning is positively related to the
market power index.  Bowman argued that are no clear cut results
that show how an oligopolistic industry would behave toward new
process innovations.
Bresnahan's model allows us to integrate industry
developments related to the adoption of technological innovations
into the market power index and examine this issue empirically. 
Levin's results suggested that firms in more concentrated markets
diffuse optical scanners through their network of stores more
quickly.  Our results are consistent with Levin's findings and
show that adoption of scanning technology had a positive and
significant impact on the market power index.  However, the
overall market power index was not significantly different from
zero, the level consistent with competitive pricing.14
Oster identified a wave of merger activity lasting from
1982-1992 with a significant slowing of activity at the end of
this period.  The index was allowed to vary over time by using a
time dummy variable equal to 0 from 1967-1982 and equal to 1 from
1983-1992.  The coefficient on the time variable for merger
activity was positive but not significantly different from zero
as indicated by a likelihood ratio test.
Competitive conditions in the food retailing industry during
the merger wave of 1983-1992 are measured by the index of market
power 8 of 0.016 (0.017 for the logarithmic model).  The
precision of the estimated index of market power 8 is indicated
by its small standard error of 0.10.  The market power index is
very low and its calculated confidence interval includes zero,
implying that the structure of the industry is consistent with
perfect competition.  From 1967-1992 the index was very low at
0.002 for both the linear and logarithmic models. 
A likelihood ratio test examined whether the index of market
power was constant from 1967-1992.  The calculated P  test
2
statistic of 14.196 (15.803 for the logarithmic model) exceeded
the critical P  value of 7.82 at the 5 percent significance 3
2
level.  We reject the hypothesis that the index was constant and
independent of industry conditions.
The key finding is that the estimated index of market power
was virtually unchanged over the time period.  This result
provides support for the robustness of the estimated index and
does not indicate a significant shift in competitive conditions
associated with merger and leveraged buyout activity.  Cotterill15
(1993) concluded that increased market concentration and
segmentation during the 1980s enhanced the ability of leading
firms to deter entry and facilitated the exercise of market
power.  These results confirm that a slight increase in market
power has occurred but that behavior in the food retailing
industry is consistent with competitive conditions. 
Interpretation of 8 warrants some attention since the model
is estimated with aggregate industry data.  The food retailing
industry is comprised of local markets and 8 represents an index
for the average degree of market power over the individual local
markets.  This interpretation does not restrict all grocery
retailers in a local market to possess the same degree of market
power.  The different firms are allowed to exhibit different
degrees of market power and 8 represents the degree of market
power of an average firm in the market.
Following Shaffer, 8 is also interpreted as a local estimate
of the percentage deviation of the industry output from
competitive equilibrium.  The estimated value of 8 from
logarithmic model suggests that the level of competitive industry
output would be approximately 1.7 percent higher than the current
level of output. The test of competitive conduct shows no
evidence for the existence of market power in food retailing.
A final issue is to compare the performance of the linear
and logarithmic specifications.   The specifications yield
1
similar results for the interpretation of competitive conditions
in the food retailing industry.  On a theoretical basis the
logarithmic model is consistent with demand specifications16
yielding constant own-price elasticities, forms which are often
estimated in applied studies.
The logarithmic demand model avoids biases in estimating
welfare effects in imperfectly competitive markets which are
inherently associated with the linear demand model.  A functional
form for the demand equation which incorrectly imposes a linear
specification when demand is actually convex produces a downward
biased estimate of the output effects associated with market
power.
Malueg showed that the relative welfare loss due to market
power depends on the shape of the demand curve.  When the demand
curve is concave the relative welfare loss in imperfectly
competitive markets is lower than when the demand curve is
convex.  The linear demand specification with interaction terms
is frequently used in market power studies.  This specification
lacks the flexibility to account for demand curvature and its
impact on deviations from the efficient competitive output.  By
contrast the logarithmic model has the flexibility to allow for a
curvature in the demand specification. 
V.  CONCLUSION
This work develops a model of the food retailing industry to
examine industry competitive conditions and shifts in an index of
market power.  An econometric model based on the industry cost
function, demand for industry output and industry equilibrium
addresses the impact of two key structural changes that shaped
the industry from 1967-1992.17
Due to merger activity and leveraged buyouts in food
retailing, financial leverage increased significantly and shifted
away from short-term liabilities toward long-term debt.  Markets
in the food retailing industry became more concentrated and
segmented, offering opportunities for firms to exert market power
and set prices above the average costs of production.  A
theoretical model of industry behavior is applied to test for
non-competitive behavior in the food retailing industry.
The degree of market power was assessed in the U.S. food
retailing industry using a flexible model to identify deviations
from marginal-cost pricing.  The estimated index of market power
does not different from zero, implying that the structure of the
industry is consistent with perfect competition.  The stability
of the index over the 1982-1992 period, indicates that higher
debt levels have not been translated into increased market power. 
We extend the industry model to examine the impact of
technological changes and innovations in retail store formats on
competitive conduct.18
FOOTNOTE
1. As Greene (1993) notes the linear and logarithmic models are
not nested.  Attempts to apply a Lagrange multiplier test or a
likelihood ratio test for the linear model (2 = 1) and the
logarithmic model (2 = 0) against the general model were not
successful.  We are unaware of attempts to test the Box-Cox model
in nonlinear three-stage least squares models. 
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Table 1. Parameter Estimates for Food Retailing Industry --
Logarithmic Industry Equilibrium and Demand Model 




Constant * 3.555 26.127 0
*
Price of Food from Retailers (P ) * 1.509 2.0154 Q1
*
Disposable Income Per Capita (DI) * 0.063 0.743 2
Price of Food Away from Home (PFAWAY) * 1.514 12.7580  3
*
Female/Male Wage Ratio (WAGERATIO) * 0.190 2.805 4
*
P *DI * -0.378 -1.805 Q 5
P *PFAWAY * -3.186 -2.083 Q 6
*
P *WAGERATIO * 2.379 2.150 Q 7
*
Marginal Cost Equation
Constant $ -1.352 -2.368 1
*
Output of Food Retailers $ 0.430 2.372 2
*
Price of Food Purchased by Retailers $ -0.020 -0.710 3
Price of Capital $ 0.368 2.473 4
*
Price of Labor $ -0.495 -2.586 5
*
Price of Energy $ 1.149 0.338 6
Total Current Liabilities N 0.278 2.970 F1
*
Total Long Term Debt N -0.183 -2.072 F2
*
Market Power Index
Sales per Checkout ( -0.493E-05 1.496 1
Merger Activity Dummy (1983-1992) ( 0.015 1.687 2
Percent of Stores Scanning ( 0.011 1.741 3
Demand Ind Equil
R-Squared 0.98 0.93
 Asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
a20
Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Food Retailing Industry --
Linear Industry Equilibrium and Demand Model 




Constant * -48.415 -3.244 0
*
Price of Food from Retailers (P ) * 28.728 1.863 Q1
Disposable Income Per Capita (DI) * 111.670 1.749 2
Price of Food Away from Home (PFAWAY) * 114.330 3.305  3
*
Female/Male Wage Ratio (WAGERATIO) * -141.340 -1.922 4
*
P *DI * -94.956 -1.848 Q 5
P *PFAWAY * -75.360 -2.100 Q 6
*
P *WAGERATIO * 152.330 2.149 Q 7
*
Marginal Cost Equation
Constant $ -1.489 -2.709 1
*
Output of Food Retailers $ 0.474 2.710 2
*
Price of Food Purchased by Retailers $ -0.024 -0.735 3
Price of Capital $ 0.373 2.489 4
*
Price of Labor $ -0.507 -2.649 5
*
Price of Energy $ 1.158 0.339 6
*
Total Current Liabilities N 0.295 3.111 F1
*
Total Long Term Debt N -0.184 -2.050 F2
*
Market Power Index
Sales per Checkout ( -0.430E-05 -1.376 1
Merger Activity Dummy (1983-1992) ( 0.014 1.623 2
Percent of Stores Scanning ( 0.010 1.780 3
Demand Ind Equil
R-Squared 0.98 0.94
 Asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
a21
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